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Abstract
In response to the global ¯nancial crisis that started in August 2007, central banks pro-
vided extraordinary amounts of liquidity to the ¯nancial system. To investigate the e®ect
of central bank liquidity facilities on term interbank lending rates, we estimate a six-factor
arbitrage-free model of U.S. Treasury yields, ¯nancial corporate bond yields, and term
interbank rates. This model can account for °uctuations in the term structure of credit
risk and liquidity risk. A signi¯cant shift in model estimates after the announcement of
the liquidity facilities suggests that these central bank actions did help lower the liquidity
premium in term interbank rates.
We thank conference participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Bank of England, KÄ oc University,
and the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco|and especially, Pierre Collin-Dufresne and Simon Potter|for
helpful comments. The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be
interpreted as re°ecting the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.
Draft date: June 2, 2009.1 Introduction
In early August 2007, amidst declining prices and credit ratings for U.S. mortgage-backed
securities and other forms of structured credit, international money markets came under
severe stress. Short-term funding rates in the interbank market rose sharply relative to yields
on comparable-maturity government securities. For example, the three-month U.S. dollar
London interbank o®ered rate (LIBOR) jumped from only 20 basis points higher than the
three-month U.S. Treasury yield during the ¯rst seven months of 2007 to over 110 basis points
higher during the ¯nal ¯ve months of the year. This enlarged spread was also remarkable for
persisting into 2008.
LIBOR rates are widely used as reference rates in ¯nancial instruments, including deriva-
tives contracts, variable-rate home mortgages, and corporate notes, so their unusually high
levels in 2007 and 2008 appeared likely to have widespread adverse ¯nancial and macroe-
conomic repercussions.1 To limit these adverse e®ects, central banks around the world es-
tablished an extraordinary set of lending facilities that were intended to increase ¯nancial
market liquidity and ease strains in term interbank funding markets, especially at maturities
of a few months or more. Monetary policy operations typically focus on an overnight or very
short-term interbank lending rate. However, on December 12, 2007, the Bank of Canada, the
Bank of England, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve, and the Swiss
National Bank jointly announced a set of measures designed to address elevated pressures
in term funding markets. These measures included foreign exchange swap lines established
between the Federal Reserve and the ECB and the Swiss National Bank to provide U.S. dol-
lar funding in Europe. The Federal Reserve also announced a new Term Auction Facility, or
TAF, to provide depository institutions with a source of term funding. The TAF term loans
were secured with various forms of collateral and distributed through an auction.
The TAF and similar term lending facilities by other central banks were not monetary
policy actions as traditionally de¯ned.2 Instead, these central bank actions were meant to
improve the distribution of reserves and liquidity by targeting a narrow market-speci¯c fund-
ing problem. The press release introducing the TAF described its purpose in this way: \By
allowing the Federal Reserve to inject term funds through a broader range of counterparties
and against a broader range of collateral than open market operations, this facility could help
1As a convenient redundancy, we follow the literature in referring to \LIBOR rates."
2The Federal Reserve, in its normal operations, tries to hit a daily target for the federal funds rate, which
is the overnight interest rate for interbank lending of bank reserves. The central bank liquidity facilities were
not intended to alter the current level or the expected future path for the funds rate or the overall level of
bank reserves (i.e., the term lending was sterilized by sales of Treasury securities).
1promote the e±cient dissemination of liquidity when the unsecured interbank markets are
under stress." (Federal Reserve Board, December 12, 2007).
This paper assesses the e®ect of the establishment of these extraordinary central bank
liquidity facilities on the interbank lending market and, in particular, on term LIBOR spreads
over Treasury yields. In theory, the provision of central bank liquidity could lower the liquidity
premium on interbank debt through a variety of channels. On the supply side, banks that
have a greater assurance of meeting their own unforseen liquidity needs over time should
be more willing to extend term loans to other banks. In addition, creditors should also be
more willing to provide funding to banks that have easy and dependable access to funds,
since there is a greater reassurance of timely repayment. On the demand side, with a central
bank liquidity backstop, banks should be less inclined to borrow from other banks to satisfy
any precautionary demand for liquid funds because their future idiosyncratic demands for
liquidity over time can be met via the backstop. However, assessing the relative importance
of these channels is di±cult. Furthermore, judging the e±cacy of central bank liquidity
facilities in lowering the liquidity premium is complicated because LIBOR rates, which are
for unsecured bank deposits, also include a credit risk premium for the possibility that the
borrowing bank may default. The elevated LIBOR spreads during the ¯nancial crisis likely
re°ected both higher credit risk and liquidity premiums, so any assessment of the e®ect of
the recent extraordinary central bank liquidity provision must also control for °uctuations in
bank credit risk.
To analyze the e®ectiveness of the central bank liquidity facilities in reducing interbank
lending pressures, we use a multifactor arbitrage-free (AF) representation of the term struc-
ture of interest rates and bank credit risk. Speci¯cally, we estimate an a±ne arbitrage-free
term structure representation of U.S. Treasury yields, the yields on bonds issued by ¯nan-
cial institutions, and term LIBOR rates using weekly data from 1995 to midyear 2008. For
tractability, the model uses the arbitrage-free Nelson-Siegel (AFNS) structure. Christensen,
Diebold, and Rudebusch (CDR, 2007) show that a three-factor AFNS model ¯ts and forecasts
the Treasury yield curve very well and avoids many of the estimation di±culties encountered
with unrestricted AF latent factor models. In this paper, we incorporate three additional fac-
tors: two factors that capture bank debt risk dynamics, as in Christensen and Lopez (2008),
and a third factor speci¯c to LIBOR rates. The resulting six-factor representation provides
arbitrage-free joint pricing of Treasury yields, ¯nancial corporate bond yields, and LIBOR
rates. This structure allows us to decompose movements in LIBOR rates into changes in bank
debt risk premiums and changes in a factor speci¯c to the interbank market that includes
2a liquidity premium. We can also conduct hypothesis testing and counterfactual analysis
related to the introduction of the central bank liquidity facilities.
Our results support the view that the central bank liquidity facilities established in Decem-
ber 2007 helped lower LIBOR rates. Speci¯cally, the parameters governing the term LIBOR
factor within the model are shown to change after the introduction of the liquidity facilities.
The hypothesis of constant parameters is overwhelmingly rejected, suggesting that the be-
havior of this factor, and thus of the LIBOR market, was directly a®ected by the introduction
of central bank liquidity facilities. To quantify this e®ect, we use the model to construct a
counterfactual path for the 3-month LIBOR rate by assuming that the LIBOR-speci¯c factor
remained constant at its historical average after the introduction of the liquidity facilities.
Our analysis suggests that the counterfactual 3-month LIBOR rate averaged signi¯cantly
higher|on the order of 70 basis points higher|than the observed rate from December 2007
through the middle of 2008. Figure 1 shows the di®erence between the observed three-month
LIBOR rate and our model-implied counterfactual path for that rate during this period. From
the start of the ¯nancial crisis|which was triggered by an August 9, 2007, announcement by
the French bank BNP Paribas|until the TAF and swap joint central bank announcement in
mid-December 2007, the observed LIBOR rate averaged 8 basis points higher that the coun-
terfactual rate. Such signs of distress in the interbank market helped spur the announcement
of the central bank liquidity facilities. After that announcement, the di®erence between the
observed three-month LIBOR rate and the counterfactual rate quickly turned negative and
reached approximately -75 basis points, where it stayed for the remainder of our sample. This
result suggests that if the central bank liquidity facilities had not been created, the 3-month
LIBOR rate would have been substantially higher.
There are two recent research literatures particularly relevant to our analysis. First, in
terms of methodology, our empirical model is similar to earlier factor models of LIBOR rates,
notably Collin-Dufresne and Solnik (2001) and FeldhÄ utter and Lando (2008). FeldhÄ utter and
Lando (2008), for example, incorporate a LIBOR rate in a six-factor arbitrage-free model of
Treasury, swap, and corporate yields. They use two factors to describe Treasury yields, two
factors for the credit spreads of ¯nancial corporate bonds, one factor for LIBOR rates, and
one factor for swap rates|with all factors assumed to be independent. Although similar,
our six-factor model allows for complete dynamic interactions among the various factors and
includes a broader range of maturities in the estimation. A second relevant literature, of
course, is the burgeoning analysis of the recent ¯nancial crisis. Notably, with respect to the
interbank market, Taylor and Williams (2009), McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008) and
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Figure 1: Di®erence Between the Three-Month LIBOR Rate and Counterfactual.
This ¯gure shows the observed three-month LIBOR rate minus the model-implied counter-
factual path generated by ¯xing the LIBOR-speci¯c factor at its historical average prior to
December 14, 2007, in e®ect neutralizing the idiosyncratic e®ects in the LIBOR market. The
illustrated period starts at the beginning of 2007, while the model estimation sample covers
the period from January 6, 1995 to July 25, 2008.
Wu (2009) examine the e®ect of central bank liquidity facilities on the liquidity premium in
LIBOR by controlling for movements in credit risk as measured by credit default swap prices
for the borrowing banks in standard simple event-study regressions.3 Unfortunately, based on
only small di®erences in the speci¯cations of their regressions, these studies disagree about the
e®ectiveness of the central bank actions; therefore, we employ a very di®erent methodology
that provides a complete accounting of the dynamics of credit and liquidity risk.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents our data and
details the structure of our empirical six-factor arbitrage-free term structure model. Section
3 presents our estimation method and model estimates, and Section 4 focuses on the ¯nancial
crisis that started in August 2007. It describes the central bank liquidity facilities established
3There are also recent related theoretical analysis of liquidity in the interbank lending market, as described
in Allen, Carletti, and Gale (2009).
4and the subsequent interest rate movements through the lens of our estimated model. Various
interpretations of our results are considered. Section 6 concludes.
2 An Empirical Model of Treasury, Bank, and LIBOR Yields
In this section, we describe the data from the three ¯nancial markets of interest to our analysis
and introduce an a±ne arbitrage-free joint model of Treasury yields, ¯nancial bond yields,
and LIBOR rates.
2.1 Three Financial Markets
Treasury securities, bank bonds, and interbank term lending contracts are closely related
debt instruments but di®er in their relative amounts of credit and liquidity risk. Treasury
securities are generally considered to be free from credit risk and are the most liquid debt
instruments available. In our empirical work, we use 708 weekly observations (Fridays) from
January 6, 1995, to July 25, 2008 on zero-coupon Treasury yields with maturities of 3, 6, 12,
24, 36, 60, 84, and 120 months, as described by GÄ urkaynak, Sack and Wright (2007).4 Prices
for unsecured lending of U.S. dollars at various maturities between banks are given by LIBOR
rates, which are determined each business morning by a British Bankers' Association (BBA)
survey of a panel of 16 large banks.5 In the credit risk literature (e.g., Collin-Dufresne and
Solnik 2001), LIBOR rates are often considered on par with AA-rated corporate bond rates
since the BBA survey panel of banks is reviewed and revised as necessary to maintain high
credit quality. Our LIBOR data consist of the 3-, 6-, and 12-month maturities.6
Figure 2 illustrates the spread of the three-month LIBOR rate over the three-month
Treasury yield. Both the size and duration of this elevated spread in 2007 and 2008 clearly
stand out as exceptional. A key date is August 9, 2007, which marks the start of the turmoil
in ¯nancial markets and the jump in LIBOR rates. An important trigger for the ¯nancial
4We limit our sample to the ¯rst year of the ¯nancial crisis for two reasons. During this period, the Fed's
liquidity operations were being sterilized, so they altered the composition and not the size of the Fed's balance
sheet. Also, after the end of our sample, there were additional policy actions, such as government insurance
for bank debt and interbank loans, that have potentially signi¯cant implications for bank credit and liquidity
risk but do not involve direct injections of liquidity. Therefore, our limited sample allows us to get a clean
reading on just the e®ect of liquidity facilities.
5The BBA discards the four highest and four lowest quotes and takes the average of the remaining eight
quotes, which becomes the LIBOR rate for that speci¯c term deposit on that day. Currently, the banks in
the U.S. dollar LIBOR panel include: Bank of America, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd, Barclays Bank
plc, Citibank NA, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank AG, HBOS, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Lloyds TSB Bank plc,
Rabobank, Royal Bank of Canada, The Norinchukin Bank, The Royal Bank of Scotland Group, UBS AG, and
West LB AG.
6Appendix 1 describes the conversion of the quoted LIBOR rates into continuously compounded yields.
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Figure 2: Spread of Three-Month LIBOR rate over the Treasury Yield.
This ¯gure shows the weekly spread of the three-month LIBOR rate over the three-month
Treasury bond yield from January 6, 1995 to July 25, 2008.
crisis and the tightening of the money markets was the announcement by the French bank
BNP Paribas that it would suspend redemptions from three of its investment funds.7 The
mean spread in our sample prior to August 10, 2007, is about 25 basis points, while after
that date, the mean spread is 98 basis points.8 Fluctuations in the LIBOR-Treasury spread
are commonly attributed to movements in credit and liquidity risk premiums.9 The credit
risk premium compensates for the possibility that the borrowing bank will default. The
7The BNP Paribas press release stated that \the complete evaporation of liquidity in certain market seg-
ments of the U.S. securitization market has made it impossible to value certain assets fairly regardless of their
quality or credit rating ... during these exceptional times, BNP Paribas has decided to temporarily suspend
the calculation of the net asset value as well as subscriptions/redemptions."
8Data on the LIBOR-Treasury spread and on a very similar spread, the well-known eurodollar to Treasury
(or TED) yield spread, can be obtained earlier than the 1995 start of our estimation sample (which is determined
by the availability of bank debt rates). Even in comparison to these earlier periods, the recent episode stands
out as extraordinary.
9The LIBOR-Treasury spread is also a®ected by changes in the \convenience yield" for holding Treasury
securities; therefore, FeldhÄ utter and Lando (2008) and others use swap rates as an alternative riskless rate
benchmark that is free from idiosyncratic Treasury movements. However, because we focus on the dynamic
interactions between bank bond yields and LIBOR rates, the choice of the risk-free rate is not an issue for our
analysis. Also note that seasonality issues, such as examined by Neely and Winters (2006), should not be an
issue for our analysis since our LIBOR rates have maturities greater than one month.
6liquidity risk premium is compensation for tying up funds in loans that|unlike liquid Treasury
securities|cannot easily be unwound before the loan matures. Importantly, liquidity risk
depends on the expected size of the idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks that e®ect
both the lender and borrower.10 Speci¯cally, in the interbank market, borrowing and lending
banks worry about their ability to obtain ready funds during the term of the loan, and each
may desire a precautionary liquidity bu®er.
To shed some light on the extent to which the jump in LIBOR rates represented an
increase in liquidity risk or in credit risk, our empirical analysis compares these rates to
yields on the unsecured bonds of U.S. ¯nancial institutions. We obtain zero-coupon yields on
the bond debt of U.S. banks and ¯nancial corporations from Bloomberg at the eight Treasury
maturities listed above. Our empirical model will estimate the amount of risk associated with
this ¯nancial debt by pooling across ¯ve di®erent categories: A-rated and AA-rated ¯nancial
corporate debt, and BBB-, A-, and AA-rated bank debt.11 Yields for the ¯rst four types
of debt are available for our entire 1995-2008 sample, while yields on AA-rated bank debt
are only available after August 2001. At comparable maturities, LIBOR rates and yields on
AA-rated bank debt should be very close because both represent the cost of lending unsecured
funds to similar institutions. Indeed, for much of our sample, these rates are almost identical.
As shown in Figure 3, at a three-month maturity, the spread of the AA-rated bank debt yield
over the LIBOR rate and the spread of the AA-rated ¯nancial corporate debt yield over the
LIBOR rate are typically very close to zero. Furthermore, most deviations|say, in 2001 and
2002|were short-lived; therefore, ¯nancial bond debt and interbank loans appear to have
had very similar credit and liquidity risk characteristics. Of course, there was a persistent
and exceptional deviation that started at the end of 2007 during which the LIBOR fell below
the yield on comparable ¯nancial corporate debt. We provide empirical evidence in Section
5 that the relatively low rate on interbank borrowing after December 12, 2007, re°ected the
extraordinary commitment by central banks to provide liquidity to the interbank market.
2.2 Six-factor AFNS Model
In this subsection, we introduce a joint a±ne AF model of Treasury yields, ¯nancial bond
yields, and LIBOR rates. Following Du±e and Kan (1996), a±ne AF term structure models
have been very popular, especially because yields are convenient linear functions of underlying
10The underlying liquidity risk is systemic in nature, as in Li, et al. (2009); that is, the borrowing or lending
bank may be unable to sell su±cient quantities of assets in a timely manner and at a low cost, especially
without a signi¯cant adverse e®ect on market prices.
11Appendix 1 describes the conversion of the reported interest rates into continuously compounded yields.
For more information on the Bloomberg data, see FeldhÄ utter and Lando (2008).
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Figure 3: Spreads of Three-Month Bank Debt Yields over LIBOR Rates.
This ¯gure shows the yield spread on three-month bonds issued by AA-rated U.S. banks over
the three-month LIBOR rate and the similar spread for AA-rated U.S. ¯nancial ¯rms. The
data for ¯nancial ¯rms are from January 6, 1995, to July 25, 2008, while the data for banks
start on September 21, 2001.
latent factors with factor loadings that can be calculated from a system of ordinary di®erential
equations. Unfortunately, there are many technical di±culties involved with the estimation of
AF latent factor models, which tend to be overparameterized and have numerous likelihood
maxima that have essentially identical ¯t to the data but very di®erent implications for
economic behavior (Kim and Orphanides, 2005 and Du®ee, 2008). Researchers have employed
a variety of techniques to facilitate estimation including the imposition of additional model
structure.12 Notably, CDR impose general level, slope, and curvature factor loadings that
are derived from the popular Nelson and Siegel (1987) yield curve to obtain an AFNS model.
They show that such a model can closely ¯t and forecast the term structure of Treasury yields
quite well over time and can be estimated in a straightforward and robust fashion.
In this paper, we show that an AFNS model can be readily estimated for a joint rep-
12For example, many researchers simply restrict parameters with small t-statistics in a ¯rst round of esti-
mation to zero. Du®ee (2008) describes the di±culties associated with the canonical model that require \a
fairly elaborate hands-on estimation procedure."
8resentation of Treasury, bank bond, and LIBOR yields.13 Researchers have typically found
that three factors|typically referred to as level, slope, and curvature|are su±cient to model
the time-variation in the cross-section of nominal Treasury bond yields (e.g., Litterman and
Scheinkman, 1991). Similarly, we use a three-factor representation for Treasury yields. The
most general joint model of Treasury, bank bond, and LIBOR rates would add three more
factors for the bank bond yield curve and another three for the LIBOR rates of various ma-
turities. However, this nine-factor model is unlikely to be the most parsimonious empirical
representation, for as noted in the previous section, movements in Treasury, bank bond, and
LIBOR rates all share common elements.
Some evidence on the number of additional factors required to capture variation in ¯-
nancial bond yields can be obtained from their principal components. We subtract the bond
yields for the four categories of debt that are available for our complete sample (i.e., A-rated
and AA-rated ¯nancial corporate debt and BBB- and A-rated bank debt) from comparable-
maturity Treasury yields and calculate the ¯rst two principal components for these 32 yield
spreads (i.e., four rating-industry categories times eight maturities). The ¯rst two principal
components account for 85.5 and 8.8 percent, respectively, of the observed variation in the
bank debt yield spreads. The associated 32 factor loadings for these principal components are
reported in Table 1. The ¯rst principal component has very similar loadings across various
maturities so it can be viewed as a level factor. In contrast, the loadings of the second principal
component monotonically increase with maturity, which suggests a slope factor. Therefore,
we include two spread factors in our model to account for di®erences between bank debt yields
and Treasuries, which is also supported by evidence in Driessen (2005) and Christensen and
Lopez (2008). Finally, as in FeldhÄ utter and Lando (2008), a single LIBOR factor appears
likely to be able to capture the small deviations between LIBOR rates and bank debt yields.
Therefore, our joint representation has six factors: three for nominal Treasury bond yields,
two additional ones for ¯nancial bond rate spreads, and ¯nally, a sixth factor to capture
idiosyncratic variation in LIBOR rates.
Speci¯cally, Treasury yields depend on a state vector of the three nominal factors (i.e.,
level, slope, and curvature) denoted as XT
t = (LT
t ;ST
t ;CT
t ). The instantaneous risk-free rate
is given by
rT
t = LT
t + ST
t ;
while the dynamics of the three state variables under the risk-neutral (or Q) pricing measure
13In related work, Christensen, Lopez, and Rudebusch (2008) show that a four-factor AFNS model provides
a tractable and robust joint empirical model of nominal and real Treasury yield curves.
9U.S. Financials U.S. Banks Maturity
A AA BBB A in months
PC1 PC2 PC1 PC2 PC1 PC2 PC1 PC2
3 -0.16 -0.31 -0.16 -0.37 -0.18 -0.26 -0.14 -0.27
6 -0.15 -0.24 -0.14 -0.30 -0.17 -0.22 -0.15 -0.24
12 -0.14 -0.06 -0.13 -0.13 -0.16 -0.05 -0.15 -0.10
24 -0.17 0.01 -0.16 -0.08 -0.20 0.06 -0.18 -0.02
36 -0.20 0.08 -0.19 -0.01 -0.21 0.15 -0.19 0.11
60 -0.20 0.15 -0.18 0.05 -0.21 0.16 -0.20 0.09
84 -0.17 0.19 -0.17 0.12 -0.22 0.30 -0.20 0.19
120 -0.16 0.16 -0.15 0.10 -0.22 0.13 -0.19 0.07
Table 1: Loadings on the First Two Principal Components of Credit Spreads
This table reports the loadings of each maturity on the ¯rst (PC1) and second (PC2) principal
components for the zero-coupon credit spreads for A- and AA-rated U.S. ¯nancial ¯rms and
BBB- and A-rated U.S. banks covering the period from January 6, 1995, to July 25, 2008.
The analysis is based on 32 time series, each with 708 weekly observations.
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where WQ is a standard Brownian motion in R3. Given this a±ne framework, CDR show
that the yield on a zero-coupon Treasury bond with maturity ¿ at time t, yT
t (¿), is given by
yT
t (¿) = LT
t +
Ã
1 ¡ e¡¸T¿
¸T¿
!
ST
t +
Ã
1 ¡ e¡¸T¿
¸T¿
¡ e¡¸T¿
!
CT
t +
AT(¿)
¿
:
That is, the three factors are given exactly the same level, slope, and curvature factor loadings
as in the Nelson-Siegel (1987) yield curve. A shock to LT
t a®ects yields at all maturities uni-
formly; a shock to ST
t a®ects yields at short maturities more than long ones; and a shock to
CT
t a®ects mid-range maturities most.14 The yield function also contains a yield-adjustment
term,
AT(¿)
¿ , that is time-invariant and only depends on the maturity of the bond. CDR
provide an analytical formula for this term, which under our identi¯cation scheme is entirely
determined by the volatility matrix. CDR ¯nd that allowing for a maximally °exible pa-
rameterization of the volatility matrix diminishes out-of-sample forecast performance, so we
14Again, it is this identi¯cation of the general role of each factor, even though the factors themselves remain
unobserved and the precise factor loadings depend on the estimated ¸, that ensures the estimation of the
AFNS model is straightforward and robust|unlike the maximally °exible a±ne arbitrage-free model.
10restrict it to be diagonal.15
To incorporate bond yields for U.S. banks and ¯nancial ¯rms into this structure, we follow
Christensen and Lopez (2008). Namely, the instantaneous discount rate for corporate bonds
from industry i (bank or ¯nancial corporation) with rating c (BBB, A, or AA) is assumed to
be
r
i;c
t = ®
i;c
0 +
³
1 + ®
i;c
LT
´
LT
t +
³
1 + ®
i;c
ST
´
ST
t +
³
®
i;c
LS
´
LS
t +
³
®
i;c
SS
´
SS
t ;
where
³
LT
t ;ST
t
´
are the Treasury factors described above and
³
LS
t ;SS
t
´
are two bank debt
yield spread factors. The instantaneous credit spread over the instantaneous risk-free Treasury
rate becomes
s
i;c
t ´ r
i;c
t ¡ rT
t
= ®
i;c
0 +
³
®
i;c
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´
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t +
³
®
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´
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³
®
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´
SS
t :
Note that the sensitivity of these risk factors can be adjusted by varying the ®i;c parameters,
which is consistent with the pattern observed in the principal component analysis of the yield
spreads in Table 1.16
To obtain the desired Nelson-Siegel level and slope factor-loading structure for the two
bank yield spread factors, their dynamics under the pricing measure are given by
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;
where §S is a diagonal matrix, since the two common credit risk factors are assumed to be
independent of the three factors determining the risk-free rate. This structure delivers the
desired Nelson-Siegel factor loadings for all ¯ve factors in the corporate bond yield function.
As a result, the yield on a corporate zero-coupon bond from industry i with rating c and
15We have ¯xed the mean under the Q-measure at zero, without loss of generality. The AFNS model
dynamics under the Q-measure may appear restrictive, but CDR show this structure coupled with general risk
pricing provides a very °exible modeling structure.
16Note that for each rating category, we do not take rating transitions into consideration. This is a theoretical
inconsistency of our approach, but the model will extract common risk factors across rating categories and
business sectors if they are present in the data. Taking the rating transitions into consideration will not change
our results in a signi¯cant way. The model framework does allow for such extensions; for example, the method
used by FeldhÄ utter and Lando (2008) can be applied in this setting under the restriction that each rating
category has the same factor loading on the two common credit risk factors. We leave this for future research.
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where the yield-adjustment term
Ai;c(¿)
¿ is time-invariant and depends only on the maturity
of the bond.
Finally, to account for idiosyncratic di®erences between U.S. dollar LIBOR rates and
corporate bond yields paid by AA-rated U.S. ¯nancial institutions, we include a sixth factor
in the model for the discount rate applied to term loans in the interbank market. This
instantaneous discount rate is given by
rLib
t = r
Fin;AA
t + ®Lib + XLib
t ;
where the Q dynamics of the LIBOR-speci¯c factor are assumed to be given by
dXLib
t = ¡·
Q
LibXLib
t dt + ¾LibdW
Q;Lib
t :
This factor is assumed to be independent of the other ¯ve factors under the pricing measure.
Thus, the full state vector, Xt = (LS
t ;SS
t ;LT
t ;ST
t ;CT
t ;XLib
t ), of the six-factor model has
assumed Q-dynamics:
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where §Lib is a diagonal matrix. The discount rate to be applied to LIBOR contracts is then
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12The continuously compounded LIBOR yield is
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The description so far has detailed the dynamics under the pricing measure and, by impli-
cation, determined the functions that we ¯t to the observed yields. The above structure places
no restrictions on the dynamic drift components under the real-world P-measure beyond the
requirement of constant volatility; therefore, to facilitate the empirical implementation, we
employ the essentially a±ne risk premium speci¯cation introduced in Du®ee (2002). In the
Gaussian framework, this speci¯cation implies that the risk premiums, ¡t, depend on the
state variables as
¡t = °0 + °1Xt;
where °0 2 R6 and °1 2 R6£6 contain unrestricted parameters. The relationship between
real-world yield curve dynamics under the P-measure and risk-neutral dynamics under the
Q-measure is given by
dW
Q
t = dWP
t + ¡tdt:
Thus, we can write the P-dynamics of the state variables as
dXt = KP(µP ¡ Xt)dt + §dWP
t ;
13where both KP and µP are allowed to vary freely relative to their counterparts under the
Q-measure.
3 Model estimation
This section ¯rst describes our Kalman ¯lter estimation procedure for the AFNS joint model
of Treasury, bank debt, and LIBOR rates and then provides estimation results.
3.1 Estimation procedure
We estimate the six-factor AFNS model using the Kalman ¯lter, which is an e±cient and con-
sistent estimator for our Gaussian model. In addition, the Kalman ¯lter requires a minimum
of assumptions about the observed data and easily handles missing data. The measurement
equation for estimation is
yt =
0
B B
@
yc
t
yT
t
yLib
t
1
C C
A =
0
B B
@
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AT
ALib
1
C C
A +
0
B B
@
Bc
BT
BLib
1
C C
AXt + "t:
The data vector yt is a (51 £ 1) vector consisting of yc
t with 40 ¯nancial bond rates, yT
t with
the eight Treasury yields, and yLib
t with the three LIBOR yields.17 Correspondingly, the
constant term consists of a (40£1) vector Ac, an (8£1) vector AT, and a (3£1) vector ALib.
The factor-loading matrix for our six factors consists of a 40x6 matrix Bc, an (8 £ 6) matrix
BT, and a (3 £ 6) matrix BLib. Note that the ¸ parameters are included in these parameter
matrices.
For identi¯cation, we choose the A-rated bond yields to be the benchmark for the ¯nancial
corporate sector. That is, we set the constant ®
Fin;A
0 equal to zero, and let the factor loadings
on the two spread factors have unit sensitivity, i.e., ®
Fin;A
L = 1 and ®
Fin;A
S = 1. This choice
is motivated by the availability of a full sample of data for both A-rated banks and ¯nancial
¯rms, but it is not restrictive and simply implies that the sensitivities to changes in the
two spread factors are measured relative to those of the A-rated ¯nancial ¯rms and that the
estimated values of those factors represent the absolute sensitivity of the benchmark A-rated
¯nancial corporate bond yields.
17Note that y
c
t contains 40 rates across our ¯ve (industry, rating) categories after September 11, 2001. Before
that date, when yields for AA-rated bonds issued by U.S. banks are unavailable, y
c
t contains 32 series across
four categories.
14For continuous-time Gaussian models, the conditional mean vector and the conditional
covariance matrix are given by
EP[XTjFt] = (I ¡ exp(¡KP¢t))¹P + exp(¡KP¢t)Xt;
V P[XTjFt] =
Z ¢t
0
e¡KPs§§0e¡(KP)0sds;
where ¢t = T ¡ t and exp(¡KP¢t) is a matrix exponential. Stationarity of the system
under the P-measure is ensured provided the real components of all the eigenvalues of KP
are positive. This condition is imposed in all estimations, so we can start the Kalman ¯lter
at the unconditional mean and covariance matrix
b X0 = ¹P and b §0 =
Z 1
0
e¡KPs§§0e¡(KP)0sds;
where the latter is approximated with a 10-year span. The transition state equation for the
Kalman ¯lter is given by
Xti = ©0
¢ti + ©1
¢tiXti¡1 + ´ti;
where ¢ti = ti ¡ ti¡1 and
©0
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³
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Z ¢ti
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´
:
All measurement errors are assumed to be independently and identically distributed white
noise with an error structure given by
0
@ ´t
"t
1
A » N
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4
0
@ 0
0
1
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@ Q 0
0 H
1
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3
5:
Each maturity of the Treasury bond yields has its own measurement error standard deviation.
For parsimony, the measurement errors for the corporate bond yields are assumed to have
a uniform standard deviation across all ratings and maturities. Furthermore, we include a
separate standard deviation parameter for each of the three maturities in the LIBOR rate
data.
3.2 Estimation results
The estimation of our six-factor model requires speci¯cation of the P-dynamics of the state
variables. We conduct a careful evaluation of various model speci¯cations, as summarized
15Alternative Goodness of ¯t statistics
Speci¯cations logL k p-value BIC
(1) Unrestricted KP 180,171.90 86 n.a. -359,779.4
(2) ·P
35 = 0 180,171.86 85 0.7773 -359,785.9
(3) ·P
35 = ·P
16 = 0 180,171.82 84 0.7773 -359,792.4
(4) ·P
35 = ·P
16 = ·P
23 = 0 180,171.80 83 0.8415 -359,798.9
(5) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
41 = 0 180,171.68 82 0.6242 -359,805.2
(6) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
63 = 0 180,171.58 81 0.6547 -359,811.6
(7) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
13 = 0 180,171.47 80 0.6390 -359,817.9
(8) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
24 = 0 180,171.31 79 0.5716 -359,824.2
(9) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
54 = 0 180,171.01 78 0.4386 -359,830.1
(10) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
34 = 0 180,170.51 77 0.3173 -359,835.7
(11) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
32 = 0 180,170.47 76 0.7773 -359,842.2
(12) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
36 = 0 180,170.25 75 0.5071 -359,848.3
(13) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
53 = 0 180,169.37 74 0.1846 -359,853.1
(14) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
14 = 0 180,167.84 73 0.0802 -359,856.6
(15) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
15 = 0 180,167.15 72 0.2401 -359,861.8
(16) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
42 = 0 180,166.20 71 0.1681 -359,866.5
(17) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
52 = 0 180,165.23 70 0.1637 -359,871.1
(18) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
51 = 0 180,162.42 69 0.0178 -359,872.0
(19) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
31 = 0 180,160.46 68 0.0477 -359,874.7
(20) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
43 = 0 180,153.73 67 0.0003 -359,867.8
(21) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
21 = 0 180,149.97 66 0.0061 -359,866.8
(22) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
65 = 0 180,146.25 65 0.0064 -359,865.9
(23) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
46 = 0 180,142.61 64 0.0070 -359,865.2
(24) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
56 = 0 180,135.02 63 0.0001 -359,856.6
(25) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
25 = 0 180,125.40 62 < 0:0001 -359,843.9
(26) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
64 = 0 180,111.52 61 < 0:0001 -359,822.7
(27) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
26 = 0 180,083.20 60 < 0:0001 -359,772.7
(28) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
12 = 0 180,079.76 59 0.0087 -359,772.3
(29) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
45 = 0 180,059.29 58 < 0:0001 -359,738.0
(30) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
62 = 0 180,043.08 57 < 0:0001 -359,712.1
(31) ·P
35 = ¢¢¢ = ·P
61 = 0 180,038.57 56 0.0027 -359,709.6
Table 2: Evaluation of Alternative Speci¯cations of the Six-Factor LIBOR Model.
There are 31 alternative estimated speci¯cations of the six-factor LIBOR rate model with
full 6 £ 6 KP matrix. Each speci¯cation is listed with its maximum log likelihood (log L),
number of parameters (k), the p-value from a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that it
di®ers from the speci¯cation above with one more free parameter, and the BIC information
criterion. The period analyzed covers January 6, 1995 to July 25, 2008, a total of 708 weekly
observations.
in Table 2. The ¯rst column of this table describes the alternative speci¯cations considered.
Speci¯cation (1) at the top corresponds to an unrestricted 6 £ 6 mean-reversion matrix KP,
which provides maximum °exibility in ¯tting the dynamic interactions between the six state
variables. We then pare down this matrix using a general-to-speci¯c strategy that restricts the
16KP KP
¢;1 KP
¢;2 KP
¢;3 KP
¢;4 KP
¢;5 KP
¢;6 µP §
KP
1;¢ -1.084 -1.232 0 0 0 0 0.01332 0.001876
(0.152) (0.200) (0.00766) (0.000111)
KP
2;¢ 0.6535 0.3596 0 0 0.1560 -1.170 -0.009623 0.002006
(0.303) (0.295) (0.0498) (0.541) (0.00672) (0.000180)
KP
3;¢ 0 0 0.05506 0 0 0 0.06669 0.004781
(0.188) (0.0194) (0.000121)
KP
4;¢ 0 0 1.155 0.9203 -1.127 -2.807 -0.03003 0.008242
(0.583) (0.185) (0.173) (1.38) (0.0194) (0.000235)
KP
5;¢ 0 0 0 0 0.7677 13.31 -0.01803 0.02647
(0.503) (4.14) (0.00842) (0.000631)
KP
6;¢ 3.763 4.574 0 -0.3537 -0.2235 8.939 0.05616 0.004704
(0.688) (0.728) (0.141) (0.0991) (1.35) (0.118) (0.000239)
Table 3: Parameter Estimates for the Preferred Six-Factor Speci¯cation.
This table shows the estimated parameters and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the
KP matrix, µP vector, and diagonal § volatility matrix for the six-factor model. The data
used are weekly covering the period from January 6, 1995, to July 25, 2008. ¸T is estimated at
0.6407 (0.0034), ¸S is estimated at 0.3914 (0.0095), and ·
Q
Lib is estimated at 0.0366 (0.0783).
Finally, the constant ®Lib is estimated at -0.05695 (0.118).
least signi¯cant parameter (as measured by the ratio of the parameter value to its standard
error) to zero and then re-estimate the model. Therefore, speci¯cation (2) sets ·P
35 = 0, so
it has one fewer estimated parameters, and so on. This strategy of eliminating the least
signi¯cant coe±cients continues to the ¯nal speci¯cation, which has a diagonal KP matrix.
Each estimated speci¯cation is listed with its log likelihood (log L), its number of estimated
parameters (k), and the p-value from a likelihood ratio test of the hypothesis that it di®ers
from the speci¯cation with one more free parameter|that is, comparing speci¯cation (s) with
speci¯cation (s¡1). We also report the Bayes information criterion (BIC), which is commonly
used for model selection (see, e.g., Harvey, 1989) and is de¯ned as BIC= ¡2logL + klogT,
where T is the number of data observations, which in our sample is 708. The BIC is minimized
by speci¯cation (19) (the boldface entry). Although this speci¯cation is our preferred one in
terms of parsimony and consistency, we should stress that our conclusions in the next section
regarding the e®ectiveness of the central bank liquidity facilities are robust to the speci¯cation
of the KP matrix.18
18In particular, we obtained similar results using the Akaike information criterion.
17Based on the BIC results in Table 2, our preferred speci¯cation of the KP matrix is
KP =
0
B
B B
B B B
B B B
B B
@
·P
11 ·P
12 0 0 0 0
·P
21 ·P
22 0 0 ·P
25 ·P
26
0 0 ·P
33 0 0 0
0 0 ·P
43 ·P
44 ·P
45 ·P
46
0 0 0 0 ·P
55 ·P
56
·P
61 ·P
62 0 ·P
64 ·P
65 ·P
66
1
C
C C
C C C
C C C
C C
A
:
This speci¯cation imposes 18 restrictions on the KP matrix,19 and the estimated parameter
values are presented in Table 3.
These estimated parameters suggest several interesting results. First, the Treasury level
factor is not impacted by any of the other factors, supporting the empirical results in Chris-
tensen, Lopez and Rudebusch (2008) as well as Christensen and Lopez (2008). The intuition
here is that monetary policy is a key driver of the entire interest rate environment. Second,
the dynamics of the Treasury slope factor are a®ected by all the Treasury factors, again
as found in the aforementioned studies. Third, the dynamics of the two credit risk factors
are interrelated, but only slightly a®ected by the Treasury factors. Finally, in contrast to
FeldhÄ utter and Lando (2008), the dynamics of the LIBOR factor is found to be a®ected by
both credit risk factors as well as the Treasury slope and curvature factors. In addition, the
LIBOR factor in°uences the dynamics of the corporate slope factor, the Treasury slope factor
and the Treasury curvature factor. This result suggests that short-term credit rates, and
LIBOR rates in particular, contain useful information regarding the dynamics of the overall
interest rate environment. This result further highlights how important the functioning of
the interbank market appears to be for the broader capital markets.
Table 4 reports the estimated factor loadings of the state variables in the corporate bond
yield function for each rating category represented in the data sample. Note that for both
U.S. banks and ¯nancial ¯rms, lower credit quality tends to imply higher sensitivities to the
two common credit risk factors. The exception is the sensitivity of AA-rated U.S. ¯nancials
to the common credit risk slope factor, which is marginally higher than the value observed
for A-rated U.S. ¯nancials. Generally speaking, this implies that the credit spreads of bonds
issued by ¯rms with lower credit quality tend to have higher and steeper credit spread curves.
Furthermore, we can compare the risk sensitivities for U.S. banks and ¯nancial ¯rms. For the
19The likelihood ratio test of the signi¯cance of the 18 parameter restrictions jointly is 22.88. This is Â
2
distributed with 18 degrees of freedom which gives a p-value of 0.1952.
18U.S. Financials Rating
®C
0 ®C
LT ®C
ST ®C
LS ®C
SS
A 0 -0.02583 -0.06438 1 1
(0.0238) (0.00552)
AA 0.003369 -0.08189 -0.07158 0.9033 1.040
(0.000244) (0.0212) (0.00616) (0.00576) (0.0113)
U.S. Banks Rating
®C
0 ®C
LT ®C
ST ®C
LS ®C
SS
BBB 0.0001667 -0.03335 -0.07316 1.153 1.072
(0.000262) (0.0270) (0.00605) (0.00514) (0.00965)
A -0.00002714 -0.03256 -0.05644 1.032 1.024
(0.00299) (0.0241) (0.00659) (0.00554) (0.00947)
AA -0.0002488 -0.009247 -0.04037 0.8239 0.8702
(0.000492) (0.0200) (0.00684) (0.00852) (0.0118)
Table 4: Estimated Factor Loadings in the Corporate Bond Yield Functions.
The estimated factor loadings for each of the rating categories for the preferred six-factor
model. The data used are weekly, covering the period from January 6, 1995 to July 25,
2008. The numbers in parentheses are the estimated standard deviations of the parameter
estimates.
benchmark A-rating category, we see that bonds with this rating have nearly identical risk
sensitivities across the two sectors. For the AA-rating category, we see greater sensitivities
in ¯nancial bonds than AA-rated bonds issued by U.S. banks. A partial explanation for this
di®erence is the di®erent data sample periods, where yields for AA-rated U.S. banks do not
enter the sample until September 2001. Thus, the previous downturn in the credit cycle is
only partially represented for AA-rated banks, while the very calm period from mid-2003
until mid-2007 is fully represented.
Finally, Table 5 details the ¯t of the model for Treasury, bank bond, and LIBOR rates.
The ¯t of the Treasury rates is quite good and only slightly worse than in models of only
Treasury yields (see CDR, for example). For the corporate bond yields, the root mean squared
errors (RMSEs) of the ¯tted errors are in line with the estimated standard deviation for the
¯tted errors that we obtain from the Kalman ¯lter, which is estimated at b ¾"c = 11:3 basis
points. Overall, given the fact that we are ¯tting a sizeable number of corporate bond yields
jointly with only ¯ve state variables, the achieved ¯t of the corporate bond yields appears
quite good. The model ¯ts the six-month LIBOR rate perfectly, while the ¯t of the other
LIBOR rates is well within the range considered acceptable when it comes to regular Treasury
bond yield term structure models. Figure 4 illustrates the time series of the ¯tted errors for
the three-month LIBOR rates. Note that there is little deterioration in the model's ability
to ¯t the LIBOR rates during the ¯nancial crisis in 2007 and 2008; thus, the model appears
19Maturity Treasury LIBOR Bank bond yields Financial bond yields
in months yields rates BBB A AA A AA
Mean
3 -5.52 -0.50 -6.33 -4.36 -3.90 -1.47 0.90
6 -3.53 0.00 3.91 5.18 0.64 3.29 5.08
12 0.27 -0.15 0.18 0.75 1.61 -1.19 0.90
24 2.04 { 1.29 0.05 2.01 -1.30 0.18
36 -0.30 { -1.12 -0.06 1.85 -0.80 -1.31
60 -3.21 { -3.59 -6.36 -9.16 -3.37 -3.98
84 0.49 { 5.14 3.39 7.74 1.43 -1.30
120 12.61 { 0.52 1.37 -0.74 3.30 -0.49
RMSE
3 15.67 10.18 13.28 12.37 11.49 11.66 12.67
6 6.58 0.00 10.15 10.58 11.48 10.15 11.90
12 3.16 8.64 11.58 9.35 11.19 10.72 9.48
24 2.64 { 11.22 7.34 8.50 6.52 7.80
36 1.70 { 12.05 8.94 12.47 8.55 9.57
60 3.91 { 11.58 10.01 13.17 8.88 9.83
84 3.57 { 14.50 9.56 14.87 8.76 8.85
120 14.87 { 14.67 14.15 13.55 12.74 12.83
No. obs 708 708 708 708 358 708 708
Table 5: Summary Statistics for Six-Factor Model Fitted Errors.
This table provides the mean and RMSE of the model ¯tted errors in basis points for Treasury
bond yields, LIBOR rates, and corporate bond yields for U.S. banks rated BBB, A, and AA
and U.S. ¯nancial ¯rms rated A and AA. The model used is the preferred six-factor model.
°exible enough to capture the turmoil in the LIBOR market.
4 The ¯nancial crisis and central bank actions
In this section, we use the estimated model to illuminate the e®ect on LIBOR rates of the
¯nancial crisis and the central bank liquidity facilities. Figure 5 focuses on movements in the
spread between the three-month LIBOR rate and the three-month Treasury yield during the
last 18 months of our sample, from the beginning of 2007 through July 25, 2008. There are two
key dates during this period. The ¯rst, August 9, 2007, marks the start of the turmoil in many
¯nancial markets and the jump in LIBOR rates. The second, December 12, 2007, marks the
announcement by the Federal Reserve and other central banks of a strong new commitment
to improve liquidity and the functioning of the interbank market.20 Speci¯cally, the Fed
20The Federal Reserve's initial response to the dislocations in the interbank lending market in the fall of
2007 was to promote and enhance the availability of its discount window as a source of funding. In particular,
the Federal Reserve reduced the spread between the discount rate (or primary credit rate) and the target
federal funds rate. However, through the end of 2007, discount window borrowing remained relatively low and
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Figure 4: Fitted Model Errors of Three-Month LIBOR
This ¯gure shows the ¯tted errors of three-month LIBOR rates in the six-factor model with
the preferred speci¯cation of KP. The data used in the estimation are from January 6, 1995,
to July 25, 2008.
announced the creation of the TAF, which consisted of periodic auctions of ¯xed quantities
of term funding to sound depository institutions,21 and the establishment of coordinated
dollar liquidity actions with the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank. The
latter involved reciprocal foreign exchange swap lines, in which dollars were passed through
to foreign central banks so they could extend term lending in dollars abroad. The TAF and
the swap lines were meant to alleviate the dollar liquidity risk by making cash loans to banks
that were secured by those banks' illiquid but sound assets, and many interpreted the initial
mid-December 2007 announcements and actions by central banks as the key events signalling
a change in the bank liquidity regime.22 In particular, the initial announcements of the new
liquidity facilities were accompanied by a widespread realization that the Federal Reserve and
interbank lending rates remained quite elevated.
21The ¯rst TAF auction occurred on December 17 for $20 billion in 28-day credit and was greatly oversub-
scribed.
22Both the TAF and the swap lines were scaled up in size during 2008, and the Federal Reserve subsequently
also established several other liquidity facilities that provide loans to ¯nancial institutions other than banks,
such as the Primary Dealer Credit Facility.
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Figure 5: Spread of Three-Month LIBOR over Three-Month Treasury Yield.
This ¯gure shows the spread of the three-month LIBOR rate over the three-month Treasury
bond yield since the beginning of 2007.
other central banks would provide forceful and innovative responses to bank liquidity needs
going forward. Therefore, we consider mid-December 2007 as an a priori potential breakpoint
in our analysis.
After the central bank announcements and actions in December 2007, the LIBOR-Treasury
spread did fall, but not permanently, and it did not revert to its pre-August level. Accordingly,
there has been much debate about the extent to which the central bank liquidity facilities
alleviated stress in the interbank market (e.g., Taylor and Williams 2009, McAndrews, Sarkar,
and Wang 2008, and Wu 2009). We investigate this question with our estimated model.
Figure 6 shows the estimated path of our sixth factor, which is speci¯c to the LIBOR market.
Deviations of this factor from its mean (shown by a horizontal dashed line) indicate the
direction and approximate size of the di®erence between the yield on AA-rated U.S. ¯nancial
bonds and term LIBOR rates of the same maturity. Until December 2007, this factor moved
within a fairly close range around its mean. However, following the introduction of the
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Figure 6: Estimated LIBOR Factor from Preferred Six-Factor Model.
This ¯gure shows the estimated LIBOR-speci¯c factor from the preferred six-factor model.
The bond yields and LIBOR rates used in the estimation are weekly data from January 6,
1995 to July 25, 2008.
central bank liquidity facilities, it dropped quite low through the end of the sample. The
¯gure appears quite consistent with the presence of a regime change in the dynamic behavior
of XLib
t following the introduction of the TAF and other central bank liquidity operations.
To statistically test for changes in the dynamic properties of XLib
t , we investigate whether
its parameters prior to December 14, 2007, denoted
Ã
pre
Lib = (·P
26;·P
46;·P
56;·P
61;·P
62;·P
64;·P
65;·P
66;µP
Lib;¾Lib;·
Q
Lib;®Lib)
in our preferred speci¯cation, changed to a new set of parameters, denoted
Ã
post
Lib = (e ·P
26;e ·P
46;e ·P
56;e ·P
61;e ·P
62;e ·P
64;e ·P
65;e ·P
66; e µP
Lib;e ¾Lib;e ·
Q
Lib; e ®Lib):
All other parameters in the model are assumed to remain unchanged. As the Kalman ¯lter
23KP KP
¢;1 KP
¢;2 KP
¢;3 KP
¢;4 KP
¢;5 µP §
KP
1;¢ -1.072 -1.208 0 0 0 0.01132 0.001884
(0.165) (0.209) (0.0275) (0.000116)
KP
2;¢ 0.8645 0.5975 0 0 0.1343 -0.007720 0.002026
(0.372) (0.396) (0.0580) (0.0239) (0.000191)
KP
3;¢ 0 0 0.0002158 0 0 0.07634 0.004784
(0.0995) (0.120) (0.000127)
KP
4;¢ 0 0 1.034 0.9684 -1.179 -0.03393 0.008224
(0.528) (0.199) (0.187) (0.0803) (0.000247)
KP
5;¢ 0 0 0 0 0.8492 -0.01265 0.02641
(0.547) (0.0525) (0.000656)
Table 6: Parameter Estimates for Preferred Speci¯cation With Regime Switch.
This table provides the estimated parameters and standard deviations (in parentheses) of
the KP matrix, µP vector, and § volatility matrix for ¯rst ¯ve factors in the preferred joint
six-factor model with a regime switch as of December 14, 2007. The data are weekly from
January 6, 1995, to July 25, 2008. ¸T is estimated at 0.6412 (0.00357), ¸S is estimated at
0.3914 (0.00976). The maximum log-likelihood value is 180,174.56.
can handle time-varying parameters, we can test this hypothesis using the likelihood ratio
test. The estimated dynamic parameters for the non-LIBOR factors in the estimation of our
preferred speci¯cation with a regime switch are not meaningfully di®erent from before, as
shown in Table 6. Table 7 reports the estimated parameters for the LIBOR-speci¯c factor
and compares them to those for the model without a regime switch. The likelihood ratio test
of the hypothesis that no regime switch has taken place is
LR = 2[180;174:56 ¡ 180;160:46] = 28:2 » Â2(12);
which is highly signi¯cant with a p-value of 0.0052. This test suggests that the hypothesis of
unchanged parameters can be rejected and that there was a regime change during the week
before December 14.
To quantify the impact that the introduction of the liquidity facilities had on the interbank
market, we use a counterfactual analysis of what would have happened had they not been
introduced. We use the full-sample model without the regime switch to generate a counter-
factual path for the 3-month LIBOR rate that suggests what that rate might have been if it
had been priced in accordance with prevailing conditions in the Treasury and corporate bond
markets for U.S. ¯nancial ¯rms. To quantify this e®ect, we \turn o®" the LIBOR-speci¯c
factor by ¯xing it at its mean prior to December 14, 2007, and leaving the remaining factors
unchanged at their previously estimated values. Thus, the counterfactual path provides a LI-
24Regime switch Parameter Full sample
pre 12/07 post 12/07
·P
26 -1.170 -0.8762 -1.871
(0.541) (0.641) (3.00)
·P
46 -2.807 -4.806 -3.710
(1.38) (2.27) (9.00)
·P
56 13.31 16.17 40.44
(4.14) (6.15) (16.1)
·P
61 3.768 3.200 0.7395
(0.688) (0.780) (4.09)
·P
62 4.574 3.768 2.456
(0.728) (0.800) (25.7)
·P
64 -0.3537 -0.3410 -0.08937
(0.141) (0.137) (4.65)
·P
65 -0.2235 -0.1206 -0.5169
(0.0991) (0.108) (2.15)
·P
66 8.939 8.158 15.16
(1.35) (1.51) (15.2)
µP
Lib 0.05616 0.05621 0.05059
(0.118) (0.142) (0.144)
¾Lib 0.004704 0.004525 0.006325
(0.000239) (0.000260) (0.00230)
·
Q
Lib 0.0366 0.03725 0.01783
(0.0783) (0.0947) (0.0590)
®Lib -0.05695 -0.05711 -0.05654
(0.118) (0.142) (0.144)
Table 7: Estimated Parameters for the LIBOR Factor with Regime Switch.
This table provides the estimated parameters and standard deviations (in parentheses) asso-
ciated with the LIBOR-speci¯c factor with and without a regime switch included following
the establishment of central bank liquidity facilities. The model used is the preferred six-
factor model estimated with Treasury bond yields and corporate bond yields for U.S. banks
and U.S. ¯nancial ¯rms in addition to LIBOR rates. The data used are weekly covering the
period from January 6, 1995, to July 25, 2008.
BOR rate consistent with the risk factors re°ected in the yields of bonds issued by AA-rated
U.S. ¯nancial institutions.
Figure 7 illustrates the e®ect of the counterfactual path on the three-month LIBOR spread
over the three-month Treasury rate since the beginning of 2007. Note that the model-implied
three-month LIBOR spread is close to the observed spread over this period. Until December
2007, the counterfactual spread was tracking the observed spread relatively closely. However,
by the end of 2007, a signi¯cant wedge developed between the two. As of the end of our
sample on July 25, 2008, the di®erence between the counterfactual spread and the observed
three-month LIBOR spread was 82 basis points. Therefore, our analysis suggests that, the
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Figure 7: Spread of the LIBOR Rate over Treasury Yield.
This ¯gure shows the spread of the observed and ¯tted three-month LIBOR rate over the
three-month Treasury bond yield in the preferred six-factor model. The ¯gure also illustrates
the spread of the ¯tted three-month LIBOR rate when the LIBOR-speci¯c factor is ¯xed
at its historical average prior to December 14, 2007, in e®ect neutralizing the idiosyncratic
e®ects in the LIBOR market. The illustrated period starts at the beginning of 2007, while
the model estimation sample covers the period from January 6, 1995 to July 25, 2008.
three-month LIBOR rate would have been higher in the absence of the central bank liquidity
facilities.
Our empirical results suggest that the announcement of the central bank liquidity facilities
on December 12, 2007 altered the dynamics of the interbank lending market in the intended
way; that is, the increased provision of bank liquidity by central banks lowered LIBOR rates
relative to where they might have been in the absence of these actions. The abnormally
large and persistent spread between bank debt and LIBOR yields that opened up after mid-
December 2007 most likely re°ects di®erent liquidity concerns between the lender classes in
these two markets. The LIBOR rate and interbank market rate are based on banks providing
other banks with short-term funding. In contrast, the bank bond rates are derived from
debt obligations issued to a broad class of investors that overwhelmingly consists of nonbank
26institutions. While these two classes of lenders most likely attach similar probabilities and
prices to credit risk, they likely have di®erent tolerances to liquidity problems. The di®erent
degrees to which central bank liquidity operations lowered the liquidity concerns of lenders
in the interbank market by more than those in the bank bond market would be translated
directly into the spread between these two markets. (Appendix 2 provides a simple conceptual
framework that illustrates this e®ect.)
There are two other explanations that could also account for the increased spread be-
tween bank debt yields and LIBOR rates, but these alternatives do not convincingly ¯t this
episode. The ¯rst explanation centers on changes in the nature or the quality of the data.
In mid-April 2008, there were news reports that the 16 banks surveyed as part of the daily
¯xing of the LIBOR rates on U.S. dollar-denominated term deposits were underreporting
their actual borrowing costs. If such underreporting were new, the distress in the interbank
market would be more severe than re°ected in LIBOR rates, and those rates would be low
relative to the bank bond yields. However, the persistence of the high LIBOR spread through
the end of our sample period despite a speedy investigation and resolution of these underre-
porting accusations seems to undermine this possible explanation. Alternatively, the quality
of the corporate bond data, especially since August 2007, could be questioned due perhaps to
reduced bond trading. Yet, the persistence of the larger spread over several months weakens
this possible explanation as well. Also, it is hard to see why these data considerations would
be linked to a mid-December regime shift.
The second alternative explanation for the larger spread is the possibility of a change in the
relative credit risk characteristics of the bank debt and interbank loan markets, for example,
through changes in perceived recovery rates.23 Again, during our sample|and notably even
during the 2001 recession|there were no substantial similar di®erences in relative credit
risk. Furthermore, it is di±cult to date any changes a priori to mid-December 2007. Still,
conceivably, changes could have occurred in the relative credit risk between the LIBOR panel
of international AA-rated banks and the domestic AA-rated banks and ¯nancial ¯rms used to
construct the Bloomberg bank debt curves. To examine this possibility within the context of
our model, we generated synthetic ¯ve-year credit default swap (CDS) rates for the AA-rated
U.S. ¯nancial ¯rms and compared these to the median ¯ve-year CDS rate for the banks in the
23An unsecured deposit (e.g., an interbank loan) is more senior in the liability structure of a bank than
senior unsecured debt. McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008) mention a recovery rate of 91.25% for unsecured
deposits at banks with assets larger than $5 billion, as per the work of Kuritzkes, Schuermann, and Weiner
(2005). On the other hand, the data provider Markit typically works with a recovery rate as low as 40% in its
pricing of credit default swap contracts. However, it is not clear why this di®erence in recovery rates would
have changed dramatically in December 2007.
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Figure 8: Model-generated CDS spreads.
This ¯gure shows the implied ¯ve-year CDS rates for AA-rated U.S. ¯nancial ¯rms based
on the estimated parameters and factor paths from the preferred six-factor LIBOR model.
In addition, the median of the ¯ve-year CDS rates of the 16 LIBOR panel banks on each
observation date are shown. To align the level of the model-implied estimates with the
observed CDS rates, the di®erence between the ¯ve-year Treasury par bond yield and the
¯ve-year swap rate has been added. The illustrated period starts at the beginning of 2007,
while the model estimation sample covers the period from January 6, 1995 to July 25, 2008.
LIBOR panel. CDS rates are readily calculated from our model using the instantaneous credit
spread for AA-rated U.S. ¯nancial ¯rms, as presented earlier, and a recovery rate assumption
of 50%; see Appendix 3 for further details. Figure 8 presents these model-implied ¯ve-year
CDS rates relative to the median of the corresponding observed CDS rates for the banks in
the LIBOR panel. The series have a correlation of nearly 90%, suggesting that the underlying
credit dynamics for AA-rated ¯nancial institutions estimated by our model are very similar
to those observed in the CDS market. This result supports our assumption of common credit
characteristics across the LIBOR and bank debt panels and our view that this relationship
did not materially change around the announcement of the central bank liquidity facilities.
285 Conclusion
In this paper, we address the question of whether interbank lending rates have responded to
central bank liquidity operations by using a six-factor AFNS model that encompasses Treasury
yields, ¯nancial corporate debt yields, and LIBOR rates. Our results provide support for the
view that these operations, such as the introduction of the TAF, did lower LIBOR rates
starting in December 2007 and through the end of our sample in July 2008. We ¯nd that the
parameters governing the LIBOR factor in our model appear to change after the introduction
of the liquidity facilities; i.e., the hypothesis of constant parameters over the full sample
period is rejected. This result suggests that the behavior of this factor, and thus of the
LIBOR market, was directly a®ected by these central bank liquidity operations. To quantify
this e®ect, we use the model to construct a counterfactual path for the three-month LIBOR
rate. The counterfactual three-month LIBOR rate averaged signi¯cantly higher than the
observed rate from December 2007 into midyear 2008, which suggests that if the central bank
liquidity operations had not occurred, the three-month LIBOR spread over Treasuries would
have been even higher than the observed historical spread.
29Appendix 1: Conversion of interest rate data
We convert the Bloomberg data for ¯nancial corporate bond rates into continuously com-
pounded yields. The n-year yield at time t, rt(n), the corresponding zero-coupon bond price,
Pt(n), and the continuously compounded yield, yt(n), are related by
Pt(n) =
1
(1 + rt(n))n = e¡yt(n)n () yt(n) = ¡
1
n
ln
1
(1 + rt(n))n = ln(1 + rt(n)):
For maturities shorter than one year, we assume the standard convention of linear interest
rates. For example, the zero-coupon bond price corresponding to the six-month yield is
calculated as
Pt(6m) =
1
1 + 0:5rt(6m)
= e¡0:5yt(6m);
and the corresponding continuously compounded yield as
yt(6m) = ¡2ln
1
1 + 0:5rt(6m)
= 2ln(1 + 0:5rt(6m)):
We also convert the LIBOR rates into continuously compounded yields, as in FeldhÄ utter
and Lando (2008). To facilitate this conversion, we approximate the day count ratio assuming
that the LIBOR curve is smooth. Therefore, the net present value of the three-month LIBOR
contract is
NPV Lib
t =
1
1 + 1
4L(t;t + 0:25)
= e¡0:25yLib(t;t+0:25);
where L(t;t + 0:25) denotes the quoted three-month LIBOR rate. The continuously com-
pounded equivalent to the quoted three-month LIBOR rates is then
yLib(t;t + 0:25) = ¡4log
h 1
1 + 1
4L(t;t + 0:25)
i
= 4log(1 + 0:25L(t;t + 0:25)):
Similarly, the six-month and twelve-month LIBOR rates can be converted into continuously
compounded zero-coupon yields by the following formulas:
yLib(t;t + 0:5) = 2log(1 + 0:5L(t;t + 0:5));
yLib(t;t + 1) = log(1 + L(t;t + 1)):
30Appendix 2: Conceptual framework to illustrate liquidity risk e®ects
To help interpret the relative movements in Treasury, bank bond, and interbank rates and
to motivate our empirical analysis, we present a very simple framework to illustrate di®erential
credit and liquidity risks across di®erent debt obligations and, by extension, how the provision
of central bank liquidity can have di®erential e®ects on their associated yields. We assume a
simple three-period setting in which at date zero, lenders must choose among three di®erent
2-period securities as to where to invest their funds. The ¯rst investment option is a liquid
Treasury security, which pays the risk-free rate of interest, which we normalize to zero, so
a dollar invested in the liquid asset at date zero returns a dollar at date two. The second
investment option is a bank-issued bond, in which a dollar invested at date zero will return
1 + rB dollars at date two. The third investment option is an interbank loan, which will
return 1 + rL dollars at date two for a dollar invested at time zero. The rates of return, rB
and rL, will be positive to account for credit and liquidity risk.
We assume that the markets for bank bonds and interbank loans are segmented to some
degree, with di®ering market microstructures and lender preferences; in which case, rB is not
always identical to rL, which is consistent with the observed data. Speci¯cally, the interbank
market investors are predominantly banks providing other banks with short-term funding.
In contrast, bank bonds are issued to a much broader class of investors that overwhelmingly
consists of nonbank institutions. We assume these two classes of lenders share the same
perception of and attach the same price to credit risk. However, regarding liquidity risk, we
assume that the two classes of lenders may face di®erent liquidity shocks during the term
of the debt at date one and may price that liquidity risk di®erently. Formally, we assume
that at date one, bank bond investors are subject to a liquidity shock, such as an unexpected
demand for funds, that induces an adjustment cost of ®B
1 with a probability ¸B
1 . In addition,
the interbank lenders are subject to a liquidity shock that induces an adjustment cost of
®L
1 with a probability ¸L
1. Investors in Treasuries can costlessly satisfy any liquidity shocks.
Furthermore, at date two, the two bank investment options are also subject to a common
default event, in which the borrowing bank declares insolvency, with probability ¸2 and cost
±, which is less than one to re°ect only partial repayment of the principal. Any such partial
recovery is shared equally by bondholders and interbank creditors.
Given this structure, the rate of return on the Treasury bond at date zero for date two
is zero. Assuming that bond investors are indi®erent between bank and Treasury bonds and
that interbank lenders are indi®erent between the Treasury bond and the interbank loan, the
31expected returns on the illiquid assets are:
rB = ¸B
1 ®B
1 + ¸2± and rL = ¸L
1®L
1 + ¸2±:
That is, the returns compensate for the costs associated with the date-one liquidity shocks
and the date-two default, as weighted by the respective probabilities. Note that rB and rL,
and their corresponding spreads over the Treasury rate, will move together with changes in
the borrowing bank's default risk, so the jumps in the spread of LIBOR over the Treasury
rate can re°ect both credit and liquidity risk.
In contrast, in our simple theoretical structure, the spread between the bank bond rate
and the LIBOR rate only re°ects liquidity risk:
rB ¡ rL = ¸B
1 ®B
1 ¡ ¸L
1®L
1:
Therefore, °uctuations in counterparty risk will not a®ect this spread, which in our data
is the spread of the AA-rated bank debt yield over the corresponding LIBOR rate. In the
early stage of the crisis, the spread was negative as the LIBOR rate rose relative to the bank
debt rates. In our framework, this outcome would suggest that ¸L
1®L
1, the liquidity risk for
interbank lenders, initially rose during the ¯nancial turmoil relative to the corresponding cost
for the bank bond investors. The spread remained negative until roughly mid-December when
the Federal Reserve and other central banks announced liquidity operations concentrating on
the interbank market. After that, LIBOR declined sharply relative to the corresponding bank
debt rates, and the spread rose. Again, our framework suggests that the central bank liquidity
operations lowered the illiquidity cost and probability parameters for banks.
32Appendix 3: The swap premium of a plain vanilla CDS
In this appendix, the reduced-form pricing of credit default swaps is described. It is
assumed that there is a model for the instantaneous risk-free interest rate rt, a model for the
default intensity of the representative ¯rm considered ¸t, and a model for the loss rate given
default Lt. Let T denote the time to maturity of the CDS contract and let t1;:::;tN denote
the swap premium payment dates. In case of default before T, the payment on the default
leg is assumed to be the loss rate Lt times the size of the notional. Given these assumptions
the value of the default leg of a plain vanilla CDS contract per $1 notional can be calculated
as
V CDS
def (0;T) = EQ
hZ T
0
Ls1fs<¿·s+dsge¡
R s
0 rududs
¯ ¯
¯F0
i
= EQ
hZ T
0
Ls¸se¡
R s
0 (ru+¸u)duds
¯ ¯
¯F0
i
;
where ¿ is the unpredictable time of the ¯rst jump of the point process which indicates the
default time in reduced-form credit risk models (for details see Lando, 1998).
In return for the loss protection, the protection buyer has to pay a premium, here denoted
by SCDS(0;T) and quoted at an annual rate. If we de¯ne ±i = ti¡ti¡1 to be the time between
the ith and the (i-1)th payment dates, the contractual payment on the ith payment date equals
±iSCDS(0;T). In addition, the market convention requires the accrued swap premium since
the last payment date to be paid immediately upon default in exchange for the default leg
payment. Given this convention, the value of the premium leg can be calculated as
V CDS
prem (0;T) = EQ
h
SCDS(0;T)
N X
i=1
±i1f¿>tige¡
R ti
0 rudujF0
i
+ EQ
h N X
i=1
Z ti
ti¡1
SCDS(0;T)(s ¡ ti¡1)1fs<¿·s+dsge¡
R s
0 rududsjF0
i
= SCDS(0;T)EQ
h N X
i=1
±ie¡
R ti
0 (ru+¸u)du +
N X
i=1
Z ti
ti¡1
(s ¡ ti¡1)¸se¡
R s
0 (ru+¸u)dudsjF0
i
:
At inception, the swap premium is set to give the contract a value of zero:
SCDS(0;T) =
EQ
hR T
0 Ls¸se¡
R s
0 (ru+¸u)dudsjF0
i
EQ
hPN
i=1 ±ie¡
R ti
0 (ru+¸u)du +
PN
i=1
R ti
ti¡1(s ¡ ti¡1)¸se¡
R s
0 (ru+¸u)dudsjF0
i:
33In the six-factor LIBOR model, the instantaneous risk-free rate is given by
rt = LT
t + ST
t ;
while the instantaneous credit spread of the representative AA-rated U.S. ¯nancial ¯rm, which
is the category we map to LIBOR, is given by
s
AA;Fin
t = ®
AA;Fin
0 + ®
AA;Fin
LT LT
t + ®
AA;Fin
ST ST
t + ®
AA;Fin
LS LS
t + ®
AA;Fin
SS SS
t :
If we ¯x the expected loss rate at L = 50%, which is an assumption frequently made in
the credit risk literature, we can solve for the default intensity process consistent with the
estimated instantaneous credit spread process of the representative AA-rated U.S. ¯nancial
¯rm by using the following no-arbitrage restriction that must hold for the instantaneous credit
spread
s
AA;Fin
t = L¸
AA;Fin
t ) ¸
AA;Fin
t =
1
L
s
AA;Fin
t :
With the assumption of L = 50%, this translates into
¸
AA;Fin
t = 2®
AA;Fin
0 + 2®
AA;Fin
LT LT
t + 2®
AA;Fin
ST ST
t + 2®
AA;Fin
LS LS
t + 2®
AA;Fin
SS SS
t :
Combining the Q-dynamics of the AFNS state variables with the general asset pricing result
for a±ne models provided in Du±e, Pan, and Singleton (2000), CDS rates for the represen-
tative AA-rated U.S. ¯nancial ¯rm can be calculated by solving straightforward systems of
ordinary di®erential equations.
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